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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THOMAS EDWARD LANDERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 45502
Bannock County Case No.
CR-2017-1082

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Landers failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated battery?

Landers Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Landers pled guilty to aggravated battery and the district
court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.124-27.) Landers
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.131-34.)

1

Landers asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his acceptance of responsibility,
difficult childhood, mental health issues, substance abuse issues, and desire for treatment.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
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The maximum prison sentence for aggravated battery is 15 years. I.C. § 18-908. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, which falls well
within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.124-27.) Furthermore, Landers’ claim that he was
defending himself, his failure to rehabilitate while in the community, and his difficult childhood
do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense and the need to deter Landers from continued
criminal behavior. (PSI, pp.7, 9-14, 20. 1)
Landers’ background is that of an individual who has little regard for the law. His
criminal record includes felony convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse and
possession of a narcotic controlled substance. (PSI, pp.11-12.) Landers also has misdemeanor
convictions for resisting or obstructing officers, possession of a hypodermic needle, being under
the influence of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a suspended
license, taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, domestic battery without traumatic injury,
willful concealment of goods, driving without privileges, two counts of violating a no contact
order, and two counts of battery (one amended from domestic assault). (PSI, pp.9-14.) His
criminal record also includes numerous other dismissed charges, including battery with serious
bodily injury, battery on a peace officer, vandalism, being under influence of controlled
substance, entering a non-commercial dwelling, resisting or obstructing officers, disturbing the
peace, and exhibiting a deadly weapon (not a firearm). (PSI, pp.9-12.)
The aggravated battery to which Landers pled guilty in this case arose when Landers
initiated a fight with his neighbor and, ultimately, stabbed his neighbor on the side of his chest
with an ice pick. (PSI, pp.5-7.) Although Landers claimed at sentencing that he had acted in
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Citations to the page numbers of the PSI correspond to the page numbers of the electronic file
“CONFIDENTIAL CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS LANDERS 45502.pdf.”
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self-defense and/or that the stabbing was accidental (9/5/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.2-7, p.26, L.22 – p.27,
L.3), the district court found, based on the information before it, that Landers “sought [the
victim] out” and that the “circumstances were a product of [Landers’] actions” and “choices”
(9/5/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-15) and imposed a sentence that reflected the seriousness of the crime.
Landers argues that, in imposing sentence, the district court “did not sufficiently consider
Mr. Landers’ mental health.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.) Specifically, he contends the court
failed to recognize Landers’ mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing and, as a
result, did not consider the factors it was required to consider under I.C. § 19-2523. (Id.)
Landers’ argument fails to show an abuse of discretion for at least two reasons.
First, neither Landers nor his attorney ever suggested before or at sentencing that the
court should view Landers’ mental condition as a significant factor in its sentencing
determination. (See, generally, 8/28/17 Tr. and 9/5/17 Tr.; see also Aug., p.6 (“Landers never
moved this Court for preparation of a mental health examination, and in fact, it appears he never
seriously raised the issue of his mental health until after sentencing. At sentencing, Landers
focused on his drug abuse.”).) Instead, Landers raised the issue for the first time in a postjudgment Rule 35 motion in which he asserted: “Defendant had suffered from severe mental
health conditions requiring the examination set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2522. The Defendant’s
mental health conditions were a significant factor at sentencing and the failure to order and
acquire a[n] Idaho Code § 19-5251 [sic] was in error.” (R., pp.141-42.) Because Landers never
asserted before or at sentencing that his mental condition was a significant factor requiring an
I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation upon which the court could base any consideration of the factors set
forth in I.C. § 19-2523, Landers’ claim that the court erred by not sua sponte considering the I.C.
§ 19-2523 factors at sentencing is not preserved for appeal, and this Court should not consider it
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because any failure to comply with the statute is not fundamental error. E.g., State v. Carter,
155 Idaho 170, 173-75, 307 P.3d 187, 190-92 (2013) (declining to address claim that district
court erred by not sua sponte ordering an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation because
defendant never requested an evaluation and appellate claim, which was based on an alleged
statutory violation, was not reviewable as fundamental error).
Second, even assuming the district court was required to consider the factors set forth in
I.C. § 19-2523 as though Landers’ mental condition were a significant factor at sentencing, a
review of the court’s order denying Landers’ Rule 35 motion (upon which Landers also relies)
reveals that it effectively did so. In rejecting Landers’ claim that it should have sua sponte
ordered an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation, the district court explained:
The PSI in this case is unique in that it is unusually in-depth as far as Landers’
mental health and need for outpatient treatment are concerned. It contains a §192524 Mental Health Examination Report (GAIN). The PSI and GAIN described
the evaluations, rendered diagnoses of stimulant use disorder, major depression,
generalized anxiety, and an unspecified somatic symptom, and identified an
estimation of the impact of those disorders on his ability to function. By
recommending imposition of sentence, and participation in an outpatient
treatment program, the PSI addressed the other three requirements of 19-2225(3)
[sic—19-2522(3)].”
The PSI in this case was reviewed thoroughly by the Court prior to
sentencing, and had an impact on the sentence that was imposed in that it allowed
the Court to determine Landers’ need for treatment, to assess his capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, and to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense. In short, the PSI and GAIN
accomplished everything that would have been accomplished by a § 19-2225
[sic—19-2522] evaluation.
(Aug., p.7.) That Landers believes the court should have given his mental condition more
mitigating weight does not establish an abuse of discretion.
Landers’ claim that the district court failed to sufficiently consider “other mitigating
evidence,” including “his acceptance of responsibility, his unique lifelong experiences, substance
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abuse, and willingness to undergo treatment” (Appellant’s brief, p.9) likewise fails to show the
district court abused its discretion. Information with respect to each of these issues was before
the court at the time of sentencing; that the court did not specifically articulate its consideration
of that information does not show the court did not actually consider that information or give it
the weight it deemed appropriate. And a review of that information, along with other relevant
facts, clearly supports the court’s implicit determination that the sentence it imposed was
necessary to protect society and achieve the other goals of sentencing.

According to the

presentence investigator, Landers showed little to no remorse for his actions (PSI, p.25), has
failed to be rehabilitated or deterred despite past treatment attempts and legal consequences (PSI,
pp.9-14, 20-21, 25), and presents a “HIGH risk” to reoffend (PSI, p.23). Considering the
seriousness of the crime, Landers’ “extensive criminal history consisting of multiple drug, theft
and violent offenses” (PSI, p.25), and his demonstrated inability or unwillingness to be
rehabilitated or deterred, the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the
sentence it did. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Landers has failed to establish an abuse
of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Landers’ conviction and sentence.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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